INDUSTRIAL ROBOTICS / PHYSICAL AI

Intelligent motion.
Defensible safety.

Research into what robots can do, what can go wrong, and the evidence needed to keep people safe.

Tom VardonIndustrial robotics, machine safety
& functional safety
01 / RESTRICTED SPACECONCEPT STUDY
Illustrative union of fault reach envelopesThree overlapping fault reach envelopes extend beyond a smaller operating envelope. Their combined area illustrates the union concept. This is not a calculated robot safety boundary.Operating envelopeFault AFault BFault C

Evaluate each relevant failure.
Combine its reachable volume with the others.

Illustrative plan view. No dimensions or calculated limits.

RISK ASSESSMENTFAULT ANALYSISSAFETY FUNCTIONSVERIFICATION & VALIDATION

THE RESEARCH

Questions that matter
on the factory floor.

Developing concepts for industrial robots and mobile humanoids. Each note identifies an engineering question and the evidence still needed to answer it.

01

Fault-derived dynamic restricted space

How far could a robot, its payload, or its parts reach after a relevant failure? A programmed path alone cannot answer that question.

Brief overviewRead the full explanation

Start with the failure

The proposed method starts with the risk assessment and an explicit set of relevant faults. For each fault, estimate a three-dimensional reachable volume, including motion during detection and response, subsequent loss of stability, and payload movement where applicable. Combine these volumes by geometric union.

What needs to be established

Credible bounds depend on the robot's geometry, initial state, drive and brake behaviour, floor conditions, payload retention, and measured response times. A changing boundary would also require a validated means of enforcing it. This proposal is a research method, not a certified safety function or a substitute for applicable safeguarding requirements.

Engineering question: Which assumptions bound the motion, and what evidence supports each one?

02

Continuous Intent Validation

Compare predicted robot behaviour with measured behaviour. Validate completion before granting permission for the next action.

Brief overviewRead the full explanation

Permission must remain justified

Continuous Intent Validation (CIV) is Tom Vardon's developing concept for continuously checking that measured behaviour remains consistent with predicted behaviour. Its residual is expressed as r = x_m − x_hat, where x_m is the measured state and x_hat is the predicted state.

A residual alone is insufficient. The design must define comparable state variables, measurement uncertainty, allowed deviations, timing limits, and a specified response when validation is lost. Completion validation provides permission to continue, subject to the checks remaining valid.

What needs to be established

Research must examine model error, sensor faults, common cause failures, independence, timing, and the reliability of the response path. No performance level or safety certification is claimed for CIV.

Engineering question: Can an incorrect action be detected and controlled before it becomes hazardous?

03

From fault injection to engineering evidence

Connect each safety claim to an identified hazard, a measurable acceptance criterion, and a reproducible test.

Brief overviewRead the full explanation

A test should answer a defined question

A useful fault study records the initial conditions, injected fault, observed behaviour, detection time, response time, and final state. Results must be assessed against criteria established before the test.

Simulation can explore combinations that are difficult to investigate physically. Its conclusions remain conditional on the model and its validation. Physical measurements, documented assumptions, and traceable results are needed to support application-specific decisions.

Engineering question: Does the evidence support the claimed behaviour across the relevant operating conditions?

These introductory notes outline the research. Supporting documents are available below.

DOCUMENT LIBRARY

Papers & working documents.

Read the CIV explanation and download its original document. The intent-sharing draft is listed by its table of contents.

WORKING DRAFT / TABLE OF CONTENTS

Robot Intent Sharing Standard

Chapter headings from IMG STD 0003:2026, Working Draft 1.

HUMANOID JOINT FAULTS

Specifications & test records.

Supplied documents for engineering review, test planning, and tracking evidence.

WORD DOCUMENT / DRAFT REVISION 0.4

Humanoid Joint Fault Response Specification and Test Plan

Requirements and tests for knee and hip faults, with plain-language explanations. Proposed engineering specification, not a published consensus standard.

WORD DOCUMENT / SUPPLIED TECHNICAL MATERIAL

R15.108 Humanoid Joint Fault Safety Document

Supplied technical document on joint fault response and dynamic stability. Its claimed ANSI/A3 approval and publication status have not been independently verified.

EXCEL WORKBOOK / TRACKING TOOL

R15.108 Compliance Tracker

Supplied spreadsheet for organising requirement and test records. A completed tracker does not itself establish certification or standards compliance.

COMPEL KNOWLEDGE FILE

Experience behind
the research.

Our capabilities document covers robot safety assessments, functional safety engineering, machine risk assessments, electrical controls reviews, project support, and training.

PDF / CAPABILITIES DOCUMENT

Compel Robot Safety

Advanced Machine, Robotics & Functional Safety Consulting

See the full list of what I do

From design to commissioning

Risk assessments, safety architecture reviews, factory and site acceptance testing, and verification and validation.

Ontario PSHSR support

Evaluation and documentation support for the reviewing engineer. Compel does not provide the final letter stamped by a professional engineer.

ENGINEERING APPROACH

Begin with the hazard.
Finish with evidence.

AI can propose motion. A safety claim needs defined conditions, a suitable control architecture, and evidence that the required response occurs.

01 / DEFINE

Assess the application

Establish tasks, people, hazards, operating conditions, and relevant failures before selecting protective measures.

02 / SPECIFY

Make the response explicit

Define what must be detected, the required response, its timing, and the conditions for restarting.

03 / DEMONSTRATE

Test the claim

Connect analysis and measurements to acceptance criteria. Record limitations and unresolved assumptions.

SOURCE READING

Standards at the foundation.

Official catalogue links for reference. Applicability and requirements must be established for the specific system.

ABOUT COMPEL

Practical experience.
Careful questions.

Tom Vardon

Robot safety auditor, risk assessor, and safety system designer with more than 30 years of industrial controls experience.

Compel Robot Safety focuses on industrial robotics, machine safety, and functional safety. This research examines how established engineering principles can inform emerging robotic systems.